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Metropolitan Challenges and Reform Pressures across Europe – the 
Perspectives of City Mayors 
Metropolitan governance arrangements and their policy purposes have been a 
matter of debate among researchers and practitioners around the globe. While we 
may trace three broad schools of metropolitan governance – reform school, 
public choice theory and new regionalism – with each still having its proponents, 
we are interested to learn whether there are assumptions on metropolitan 
governance that have today become general knowledge among urban political 
elites. By investigating the attitudes and perceptions of city mayors across 
Europe, we show that functional multi-purpose governance bodies are indeed 
more generally associated with equitable service distribution, whereas the 
preconditions for cost-efficiency and sustainable development are more 
equivocally placed at different modes of governance. Moreover, we show that a 
perceived general lack of problem solving capacities does not automatically 
translate into pressures for metropolitan reform, but it is only in combination with 
a general disaffection with the governance structures currently in place. 
Keywords: mayors; metropolitan governance; equity; cost-efficiency, sustainable 
development; reform pressure 
Introduction 
Despite the immense growth of urban areas is Europe (nearly three-quarters of the 
European population, Eurostat 2014), most of the times the growth of metropolitan 
areas has not been accompanied by a rational and planned process of metropolitan 
institution building. In many countries, metropolitan areas have not been institutionally 
empowered in line with their demographic and economic potential due to political 
constraints and power struggles.  
From a political and institutional perspective, most of the controversy revolves 
around the reasons and arguments for creating arrangements for collective action, such 
as a metropolitan government, multi-purpose bodies, inter-municipal contracts, or 
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delegation to higher state levels. Indeed, since these concerns are strongly related to the 
political necessity of solving new (and old) problems at a reasonable (or affordable) 
cost, the issue of the effectiveness of such institutional architectures naturally emerges. 
Scilicet, together with more principled preferences for building (or not) metropolitan 
governments, basic concerns regard the effectiveness of these reforms for tackling local 
challenges. 
Up to present, scarce evidence exists regarding the local elite’s preferences for 
creating metropolitan governments linked to the elite’s evaluations of locally existing 
governance structures and present-day problem-solving capacities at the metropolitan 
scale. With the financial crisis of 2007, we would argue, issues like metropolitan-wide 
equity, efficiency and sustainability have further increased in salience. This timely 
paper aims at filling the research gap by asking whether there is an identifiable pattern 
across European mayors when it comes to their evaluation of metropolitan governance 
arrangements and their support for metropolitan reforms. From the current theoretical 
literature in this field, one might derive various expectations on how mayors evaluate 
locally existing modes of metropolitan governance in terms of their problem solving 
capacities. This, in turn, is expected to influence mayors’ attitudes towards metropolitan 
institutionalization.  
The present contribution provides valuable insights by linking individual 
mayors’ assessment of metropolitan problem solving capacities and various modes of 
governance to their preferences for metropolitan institution building. Using the rich data 
of a recent European-wide survey of city mayors, the article tests, in a first step, the 
mayoral associations between locally existing modes of governance and their 
effectiveness in tackling central metropolitan challenges. In a second step, the paper 
connects the evaluation of such particular modes of governance to the desirability for 
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implementing stronger metropolitan institutions. To the best of our knowledge, this 
work is the first comprehensive study of a set of European mayors accounting for these 
challenges and pressures for metropolitan reform. 
Schools of metropolitan governance meet real-world practitioners 
The debate on how metropolitan areas should be governed has become recurrent not 
only in the research fields of urban politics and urban studies but also on the political 
agenda (for a review see Brenner 2002; Heinelt and Kübler 2005; Savitch and Vogel 
2009). In academia, there is a consensus on highlighting the existence of three main 
approaches to metropolitan governance (the reform school, the public choice school and 
the new regionalism). These three perspectives differ by the way they define main 
metropolitan problems, the goals to be achieved, the degree of institutionalization of 
metropolitan cooperation, and the representation of the metropolitan area.  
The first approach in the metropolitan debate, the metropolitan reform tradition, 
considered politico-administrative fragmentation of the region as a problem for solving 
social inequalities, ensuring an efficient delivery of services and enhancing local 
democracy. Consequently, its proponents opted for creating a single political unit based 
on one integrated government for the entire metropolitan area (Stephens and Wikstrom 
2000). The first wave of this approach (1930s-1950s) focused on managing intense 
urban growth outside the core city (Brenner 2002, 7). The second wave came as a 
response to the opposing public choice school raising in the late 1950s, and focused 
more on the ‘internal sociospatial differentiation and re-differentiation of metropolitan 
regions’ (Brenner 2002, 7). Its development resulted in relatively numerous 
undertakings in Europe and the U.S., mainly between 1950 and 1970 (see e.g., Keating 
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1995). New reforms in the 1990s and 2000 in Canada and recent reforms in Denmark 
(2007) illustrate the influence of the reformist approach. 
In the late 1950s, the famous article of Tiebout (1956) set the basis for the 
development of the public choice approach in metropolitan debate. Its proponents 
support fragmentation of metropolitan areas for the main reasons of protection of local 
communities, closeness to the citizens, and competition among the independent 
municipalities (Bish and Ostrom 1973; Tiebout 1956). All the drawbacks of institutional 
fragmentation can be overcome by the means of voluntary inter-municipal cooperation 
(creation of single-purpose agencies). This approach has been criticised for its localism 
and lack of consideration of social inequalities at the metropolitan scale, focussing 
instead on cost and organisational efficiency in the fragmented region. The abolition of 
metropolitan governments in the 1980s, like in London (1986) and Barcelona (1987), 
were inspired by this perspective, as well as the proliferation of special districts in the 
US as the tool to solve metropolitan problems (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).  
Both traditional approaches were widely criticised, not only from a theoretical 
perspective, but also due to the very few success examples of their implementation 
(Lefèvre 1998; Norris 2001). Several factors hampering successful implementation of 
those approaches were enumerated, including: 
(1) for metropolitan reform: fears of meso and local level about losing their powers 
or even being abolished; unwillingness of central government to empower 
metropolitan areas by giving them special legal status; reluctance of central 
government to engage in a difficult political problem (it’s hard to satisfy 
everybody with the details of the reform) which therefore never moves to the top 
of the political agenda (Lackowska and Norris 2017). These problems show the 
importance of intergovernmental relations for metropolitan reform. 
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(2) for inter-municipal cooperation: organisational, political (losses of power) and 
financial costs of launching cooperation hamper its development as voluntary 
process; in most cases (as in the French case) IMC has to be supported by a set 
of incentives meaning top-down intervention, questioning its bottom-up 
character. The most quoted and most universal conditions for reaching 
metropolitan governance were mentioned by Heinelt and Kübler (2005) and 
include: political will and tradition to cooperate, leadership and incentives. 
Although the authors assigned them to the new regionalism, they are also true 
for the public choice perspective. 
As a consequence of both global changes and disappointment with the two metropolitan 
schools, in the 1990s, ‘new regionalism’ appeared as an alternative conception of 
metropolitan governance (Savitch and Vogel 2000). The new approach is strongly 
shaped by the context of globalization and the internationalization of the economy, 
which has forced metropolitan regions to compete against each other on the global 
scene (Goldsmith 2005; Denters and Rose 2005). New regionalism has shifted the main 
attention of the metropolitan debate from its institutional setting to other issues like 
international competitiveness, inclusion of non-governmental actors and metropolitan 
citizenship. All these challenges require a coherent metropolitan policy (Brenner 2002; 
Stephens and Wikstrom 2000) – metropolitan-wide strategies of development have 
started to flourish since the 2000s (Matusiak 2011). One of the new aspects is 
sustainable development, especially important for large urban agglomerations willing to 
keep their attractiveness for new citizens. 
The details of the composition of metropolitan arrangement have become less 
important, even though new regionalists are most willing to see flexible arrangements 
like strategic planning and multi-purpose arrangements that include a plurality of actors 
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as the best way for promoting economic competitiveness, but also for dealing with 
social inequalities and urban sprawl (Frisken and Norris 2001). Yet, again, new 
regionalists have been criticised of having difficulties in putting their ideas into practice 
(Norris 2001; Swanstrom 2001), mainly because the economic competitiveness of a city 
region has failed to serve as a sufficient incentive for metropolitan cooperation (van der 
Heiden et al. 2013). However, we can see the influence of neo-regionalist ideas through 
the creation of public-private initiatives like metropolitan associations for strategic 
planning (like in Turin or Barcelona) and platforms for economic development (like in 
Frankfurt, London or Toronto).  
As many studies have shown, these theories of metropolitan governance – 
promoted by national and international actors such as governmental agencies, think 
tanks, international organizations (EU; OECD), city networks (UCLG, Eurocities) – 
have influenced discourses on metropolitan governance on the ground, including 
political leaders and civil servants, business organisations, social movements and 
community groups, experts, trade unions, etc. (for some examples, see Keil 2000; 
Oliver 2000; Feiock and Carr 2001; Boudreau 2003). In many of the studies, a strong 
focus is placed on citizens’ support for metropolitan reform, regardless of the 
institutional arrangement put in place (e.g., Schaap 2005; Hamilton 2000). Other studies 
have focused on the citizens’ perceptions of metropolitan governance, not only on their 
perception of metropolitan areas as political and communitarian spaces but also on the 
specific institutional models of metropolitan governance (mergers, direct election of 
metropolitan mayors and assemblies; see for instance Kübler 2005; Lidström 2006, 
2010, 2013; Lackowska and Mikuła 2015; and Vallbé, Magre and Tomàs 2015). 
But also the support of local politicians is taken up as an important reform 
factor. In relation to the role of mayors, several case studies have analysed their 
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preferences and actions for a type of metropolitan arrangement, both from quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (see for example Baraize and Négrier 2001; Hogen-Esch 
2001; Savitch and Vogel 2004; Heinelt and Zimmermann 2011; Mikuła 2011; Tomàs 
2012a, 2012b; Dąbrowska and Szmigiel-Rawska 2015).  
These studies show that mayors are more inclined to one or another mode of 
metropolitan governance, this depending mainly on local contextual factors, but also 
political orientations and preferences of other actors. For instance, the size and shape of 
the agglomeration (monocentric, polycentric, having a big or small central city), the 
ideology of the mayor (left-wing, right-wing) and the socio-economic composition of 
the metropolitan area (high or low inequalities, high or low segregation, poor or rich 
financial situation) are variables that shape mayors preferences to a specific model of 
metropolitan governance. Moreover, institutional factors like the political recognition of 
local governments and their place in the multilevel system of governance (more or less 
decentralised systems) have been taken into account. Especially important are 
intergovernmental relations – as we mentioned, various tiers may fear metropolitan 
arrangements would take away their powers, and in the ‘new local democracies’ of 
Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, municipalities which regained autonomy 
only recently may not be willing to undertake any inter-municipal initiatives 
(Lackowska 2009). In general, trust and political will to cooperate seem to increase 
chances for undertaking any kind of metropolitan initiatives. 
However, there has been no previous systematic European work on the 
perceptions of political elites regarding these issues, nor do we know how their 
evaluations and preferences actually reflect the various schools of metropolitan 
governance. 
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Hypotheses: contextual evaluations, core beliefs, and reform pressures 
For this paper, we propose a basic framework to analyse mayors’ perceptions and 
attitudes with regard to metropolitan governance and metropolitan reforms. Taking into 
account the limitations emanating from an evident multicausal environment, we proceed 
to test our research question related to how to understand individual mayors’ 
assessments of metropolitan problem solving capacities, together with their support for 
the creation of metropolitan governments. The specific problem solving capacities 
investigated here focus on three aspects that are central to the three approaches to 
metropolitan governance: equitable distribution, cost-efficiency and sustainable 
development.1 As has been highlighted by the existing literature, mayoral satisfaction 
with problem solving capacity and pressures for metropolitan reforms will depend on a 
wide range of aspects, including their experience with various elements of their 
particular metropolitan arrangement (e.g., multi-purpose government, single-purpose 
units, voluntary cooperation). Additionally we consider mayors’ evaluations as a 
function of their individual attitudes, their social background as well as their local 
context, as depicted in figure 1. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
                                                 
1 The POLLEADER II survey does not allow for testing propositions regarding the central role 
of inter-regional competition for creating flexible arrangements mainly aiming at economic 
promotion of the region for the global market, as suggested by some critical accounts of new 
regionalism (Brenner 2002). Nonetheless, with sustainable development and cost-efficient 
service delivery, we cover two aspects that presumably have also been at the heart of new 
regionalist endeavours, whether for economic or for political motives. 
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Considering the high number of issues involved and the intricacy of the theorized 
relationships, several aspects are present that cannot be straightforwardly analysed 
pooled in a single statistical model. Therefore, the paper depicts the discussed 
theoretical tensions in two sets of distinct hypotheses. The first group aims at analysing 
mayoral associations between their local experience with single governance modes and 
their overall evaluation of metropolitan problem solving capacities, thereby taking into 
account their individual characteristics and local context. The second hypothesis puts in 
relation both unsolved challenges in metropolitan governance and core beliefs of 
mayors to understand the determinants for the support (or not) for creating metropolitan 
governments. 
Generally stated, hypothesis 1 considers that the problem solving capacities 
reported by a mayor relate to the particular mix of governance modes he or she 
perceives as currently effective. Rather than investigating the possible causal effects 
between the actual governance arrangements and their effectiveness as defined by some 
general criteria, we are thus interested in the subjective associations in the mayors’ 
minds: how do evaluations of single governance modes in place relate to their overall 
evaluation with regard to equity – or, with regard to cost-efficiency or sustainability? 
Given the three different challenges under investigation, we formulate three separate 
sub-hypotheses on associations regarding each.  
Since equity is the distinctive focus most clearly tied to reform theory, where 
metropolitan governance should be multipurpose and hierarchic in order to overcome 
negative externalities involved in inter-municipal competition and for achieving area-
wide redistribution, we formulate H1a as follows: ‘Mayors satisfied with the degree of 
equity across the metropolitan area are likely to assign upper-level governments and 
multi-purpose bodies a stronger present relevance when it comes to the development of 
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their metropolitan area, compared to mayors who are discontent with the degree of 
equity.’ This assumption is also in line with the later work on ‘City Limits’ by Peterson 
(1981), where we should expect more redistributive policies through allocating 
competences at higher levels of the political structure. Assuming that the financial crisis 
of 2007 has accentuated disparities with regard to municipal finances throughout 
metropolitan areas, we would additionally expect mayors reporting financial hardship to 
be more strongly disaffected with equitable distribution.  
A second sub-hypothesis, H1b, accounts for the main focus of the public choice 
perspective, which plants inter-municipal cooperation (mainly in the form of inter-
municipal contracts and single-purpose organisations) to be the best way for 
municipalities to ensure cost-efficient production of public services. Therefore, H1b is 
stated as follows: ‘Mayors satisfied with cost-efficiency are likely to attribute a stronger 
role to inter-municipal cooperation and single-purpose authorities, compared to 
mayors who are not satisfied with cost-efficiency.’ The role of single-purpose 
authorities, in particular, would further correspond to the new regionalist approach, as it 
relies on flexible arrangements and public-private partnerships for shaping a 
competitive economic region in terms of infrastructure and services. 
The final sub-hypothesis, H1c, departs from the fact that sustainability is a 
relatively new issue, recently incorporated into the metropolitan debate. Moreover, the 
issue per se requires coordinated management of the entire metropolitan area and across 
different policy fields and can therefore not be achieved under a fragmented 
management (cooperation between single municipalities). Therefore, ‘mayors satisfied 
with sustainable development report a stronger role of new regionalist approaches, 
combining multi-purpose governance bodies with (public-private) single-purpose 
authorities.’ In addition to this proposition, we also expect mayors satisfied with 
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sustainable development to report a stronger role of upper tiers regulations, as studies 
on local climate policies show a strong influence of central incentives and policies for 
locally undertaken actions (Hanssen et al.  2017). 
The second main hypothesis is concerned about pressures for reform resulting 
from the mayoral evaluations of their present governance arrangement and their 
combined problem solving capacities. More specifically, it is directed towards the most 
contentious of all metropolitan governance reforms: the creation of a metropolitan 
government, as proposed by the reform school.  
Under this framework, H2 functions in this way: ‘the support for creating 
metropolitan governments is stronger with mayors sharing core beliefs with the reform 
school and with mayors perceiving their existing governance-mix as dysfunctional and 
ineffective with regard to addressing major metropolitan challenges.’  
Besides these mayoral evaluations of their governance arrangements and related 
problem solving capacities, we thus ascribe an important role to previous core beliefs 
leaning towards a particular school of metropolitan governance. Even though mayors 
must not actually be familiar with the academic debate between various schools of 
metropolitan governance, they will nonetheless dispose of some convictions regarding 
the desirability of amalgamations (reform school) as opposed to inter-municipal 
cooperation (public choice school). Additionally, we expect leftist mayors, mayors 
concerned with their municipal finances, and mayors with favourable attitudes towards 
intergovernmental cooperation to be more supportive of metropolitan reforms.  
Data and method 
The analysis draws on data from the POLLEADER II survey (see Heinelt et al. 
forthcoming), conducted in 28 European countries (plus Israel) between the years 2015-
14 
 
2016. The questionnaire was addressed to all mayors of cities with more than 10’000 
inhabitants and the average national response rate was 39 percent, yielding 2691 
observations. The wording of survey items used for the following analysis can be found 
together with the descriptions of transformations in the appendix (table 4). 
Even though the items on governance modes and problem solving capacities 
were only asked to mayors declaring that their city formed part of a larger urban 
agglomeration (with its meaning explained in the filter question), we filtered the 
available answers after a cross-validation with the Eurostat (2011) database on larger 
urban agglomerations (‘functional urban areas’). Since the sample included small and 
more rural countries or countries with many missing values on the metropolitan 
governance items2, we further restricted our database to eight countries counting more 
than 25 observations, further reducing the data set from 791 to 622 cases. Since the 
sample universe now consists of all cities above 10’000 located in larger urban 
agglomerations, the average national response rate now corresponds to 30.3 percent.3 
                                                 
2 The small or more rural countries include Iceland, Cyprus, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Croatia, Ireland, Slovakia, and Austria; Romania had a very low response rate; many false 
negatives on the filter question where identified for Albania, Serbia, and Belgium; there 
were many nonrespondents in the case of England, Norway and Czech Republic; the items 
were missing altogether in Denmark and Netherlands; a low absolute number of answers 
further resulted for Hungary and Portugal. 
3 The response rate does not account for Greece since we lack information on the national 
sample universe, given the wide-ranging territorial reforms since the Eurostat classification 
of 2011. 
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The following section gives an overview of the variables of interest for the selected 
countries. 
Important data transformations refer to the battery on the effectiveness of single 
governance modes in place in a given metropolitan area. High values on the single items 
suggest that the respective governance mode is a relevant component of the local 
governance-mix, having an actual impact on the development of the metropolitan area. 
In order to discriminate the relative relevance of particular modes also for mayors 
perceiving most of the governance modes as effective, we created dummy variables 
indicating that the governance mode was not only perceived as (rather) effective, but 
also more effective than the median response in that battery.  
Additionally, in view of the analysis on the pressures for metropolitan reform, 
we developed a dichotomous variable regarding the correspondence of mayoral core 
beliefs with the basic assumptions of either the reform school or the public choice 
school. Mayors were asked whether they conceived inter-municipal cooperation or 
amalgamation as more effective with regard to four criteria: professionalization, service 
quality, cost saving, and political participation. If mayors ticked amalgamation more 
often than inter-municipal cooperation, we considered their core beliefs as being in line 
with the reform school as opposed to the public choice school.4 
                                                 
4 Since the new regionalist approach is more flexible in terms of the institutionalisation of 
governance arrangements, our proxy for core beliefs refers to the old metropolitan debate, 
demarcating reformist assumptions from public choice theory. These are useful reference 
points, since the second part of our paper is concerned exactly with the question of 
metropolitan institutionalisation. 
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As for the method, we use ordered logistic hierarchical (multi-level) regressions, 
nesting mayors and their cities (level 1) in their metropolitan area (level 2) and their 
country. Since the number of countries does not allow to adequately specifying models 
for explaining cross-country variation, we use fixed country effects in order to control 
for the particularities of each country (e.g., institutional setting, ongoing or completed 
national reforms, the national political discourse, socio-economic context). 
Mayoral evaluations and reform pressures across Europe 
Before we turn to the actual regressions, we here present the overview of the key 
variables of interest for our subsample of eight countries (table 1). Based on the 
evaluations of mayors, we realise that most modes of governance do have at least some 
relevance in most countries. It is clear that metropolitan governance often involves 
multiple modes of governance at once. Top down regulations and transfers combined 
with inter-municipal cooperation, sometimes taking the form of single-purpose 
authorities or multi-purpose governance bodies. Often, upper-level governments 
themselves provide the legal basis and incentives for inter-municipal cooperation and 
creating supra-local authorities (see, e.g., Heinz 2000). Where multi-purpose 
governance bodies exist, they are usually charged with deciding on strategic directions 
and coordinating various sectoral policies, whereas the implementation of sectoral 
policies might be delegated to single-purpose authorities (e.g., in Germany or Central 
Eastern Europe). 
Looking at national patterns in the table, we can see that the present relevance of 
upper-level support for addressing metropolitan challenges is perceived as rather limited 
in almost all countries except in Greece and Spain or federal Switzerland, where the 
cantons assume some tasks related to metropolitan governance. However, even these 
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countries follow the general pattern evident from the table: the dominating role 
attributed to inter-municipal contracts and cooperation. That governance mode is often 
complemented through single-purpose authorities (Poland and the federal countries 
Germany and Switzerland) and/or through multi-purpose governance bodies (France, 
Germany, Sweden, Poland). Yet only in France is the ubiquitous dominance of inter-
municipal cooperation surpassed by multi-purpose governance bodies effectively 
steering metropolitan developments. Mayors in Italy, in contrast, seem to be solely 
trusting inter-municipal solutions, with other modes of governance perceived as either 
irrelevant or ineffective. Given the strong dominance of inter-municipal cooperation 
across virtually all countries, it is difficult to find cross-national patterns linking specific 
governance modes with problem solving capacities in one of the three fields (see 
respective columns in table 1) – the ‘specific governance mode’ for most countries is 
inter-municipal cooperation.  
Finally, support for establishing a metropolitan government is evident only in 
Italy, with Greece and Spain seeming slightly positive about this idea. Even though 
mayors in these countries are generally satisfied with metropolitan problem solving 
capacities, they are also the most critical in terms of present-day multi-purpose 
governance bodies. In Italy, the finding suggests a clear support for the nation-wide 
metropolitan reform (Crivello and Staricco 2017), implemented only shortly after the 
survey. In contrast, mayors in France, Germany and Sweden, reporting reasonable 
effectiveness of their existing multi-purpose arrangements, are amongst the fiercest 
opponents of metropolitan reforms, with the strongest ‘no’ coming from Sweden. 
[Table 1 near here] 
[Figure 2 near here] 
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Beyond the discussed cross-national patterns, it would be interesting to relate mayoral 
evaluations to the actual governance structures in their respective metropolitan areas. 
While corresponding data would be difficult to gather regarding single purpose 
authorities or inter-municipal cooperation, with regard to multi-purpose governance 
bodies we can adhere to the OECD Metropolitan Governance Survey (Ahrend, Gamper 
and Schumann 2014), published around the time we conducted the mayoral survey. We 
complemented their coding for all cities figuring in the regressions below. Figure 2 
shows that even in areas with full-fledged metropolitan governments, mayors do not 
generally perceive this body as particularly effective for addressing metropolitan 
challenges. Still, there are clearly more satisfied mayors in these areas compared to 
areas with only soft governance bodies or without metropolitan governance bodies 
altogether.  
Mayoral associations between governance modes and problem-solving 
capacities 
Our analysis brings evidence for hypothesis 1, stating that specific problem solving 
capacities are associated with the particular mix of governance modes perceived as 
currently effective. We tested this hypothesis by a regression model for each of the three 
challenges under investigation (table 2).  
Regarding equitable distribution, a favourable evaluation seems to coincide with 
multi-purpose governance bodies being perceived as effective (model M1). We must 
note however, that this association is purely subjective, since we do not find any 
significant effect for the existence of either a metropolitan governance body or a 
metropolitan government. Rather than concluding a unidirectional causal relation from 
actual governance structures to actual problem solving capacities, we simply note that 
mayors who are satisfied with equitable distribution of public services across their 
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region tend to emphasise the role of their multi-purpose metropolitan governance 
arrangements above the role of other governance modes. Inversely, mayors evaluating 
their multi-purpose governance bodies are likely to use equity as an evaluation criterion. 
An additional regression model (appendix, table 5) suggests that this finding holds for 
the entire population of mayors, and not just for mayors sharing core beliefs with the 
metropolitan reform school.5  
Positive evaluations of cost-efficiency, in contrast, seem to be less unanimously 
linked to multi-purpose governance bodies, since effective inter-municipal cooperation 
equally seems to have a positive effect (model M2). Besides, there is some evidence for 
a positive association with support and regulations from higher state levels. We here 
focus on the stronger two effects and check whether multi-purpose governance bodies 
and inter-municipal cooperation achieve the effect in combination or separately. We 
calculate an additional model (M3) including an interaction term with both governance 
modes. Since the interaction term is insignificant, there seems to be a substantial share 
of mayors associating efficiency with multi-purpose bodies in some instances and 
another substantial share of mayors associating efficiency with inter-municipal 
cooperation in other instances. Whether cost-efficiency is associated with multi-purpose 
bodies or with inter-municipal cooperation seems not to depend on the mayors’ core 
beliefs corresponding either to the reform school or to public choice theory (appendix, 
table 5). As was the case with regard to equity, the association with multi-purpose 
                                                 
5 Our hypotheses and regression models presume general associations between governance 
modes and problem solving capacities across the entire population of city mayors. The 
interaction term added to the respective model in table 5 (appendix) is insignificant, 
indicating that the found associations are not conditional upon a mayor’s core beliefs in 
line with the metropolitan reform school. 
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governance body pertains solely to the question whether a mayor perceives a city’s 
metropolitan governance body as relevant, whereas the mere existence of a governance 
body or metropolitan government is not essential. 
Lastly, the perceived capacities for implementing a sustainable metropolitan 
development strategy seem to be strongly related to the perception of inter-municipal 
cooperation as working effectively (M4). Additionally, mayors perceiving a stronger 
role of upper-level governments tend to be more satisfied with their metropolitan 
capacities with regard to sustainable development. Once again, we test the combined 
effect for both governance modes. We find that perceived capacities for sustainable 
development remain strongly related to a mayor’s assessment of inter-municipal 
cooperation as effective or not (M5). The combined effect and also the independent 
effect by upper-level governments, however, do not reach any conventional levels of 
statistical significance. In either case, mayoral associations again seem to be driven by 
their local experiences rather than their previous core beliefs being in line with one or 
the other metropolitan governance school (appendix, table 5). 
In general, we note that individual, city or regional characteristics do not have a 
systematic impact on the mayoral evaluations of problem solving capacities – with few 
exceptions in the case of sustainability. Here, leftist mayors seem to be generally more 
satisfied with the efforts for sustainable development in their region, as do mayors in 
capital city regions, whereas satisfaction is generally lower in the larger cities within the 
metropolitan regions. Interestingly, the challenge of equal distribution seems not to be 
perceived more strongly by leftist mayors or by mayors reporting a poor financial 
situation of their municipality. This is a remarkable finding, suggesting that the strained 
public finances after the financial crisis of 2007 has not generally led to increased 
tensions within or across metropolitan areas. Also at the metropolitan level, whether the 
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area pertains to a smaller, secondary or capital city region does not seem to make a 
difference when it comes to perceptions of the achieved equity or efficiency. Different 
from the case of sustainability, within-country variance at the metropolitan level is 
almost inexistent in these two domains. 
In sum, whereas most of our control variables at individual, city and regional 
level seem to be of little relevance for mayoral evaluations of metropolitan problem 
solving capacities, the perception of their particular metropolitan governance structures 
clearly is related to these evaluations, thus confirming our hypothesis 1. In line with the 
metropolitan reform school, mayors seem to associate equitable development with 
multi-purpose governance bodies (H1a). Against our expectation, however, they do not 
seem to credit upper-level government support when achieving satisfactory 
development concerning equity. Our finding regarding cost-efficiency shows that some 
mayors actually relate satisfactory levels of cost-efficiency with effective inter-
municipal cooperation as advocated by public choice theorists (H1b), whereas in other 
cases they seem to recognise the potential contribution of multi-purpose governance 
arrangements to cost-efficiency as expected by the metropolitan reform school. City 
mayors, however, do not systematically relate single-purpose authorities with efficiency 
gains, as opposed to new regionalist assumptions. Lastly, against our expectations, 
mayors associate sustainable development mainly with the effectiveness of inter-
municipal cooperation, rather than with new regionalist governance structures with 
single- or multi-purpose authorities (H1c). In fact, since public choice theory was more 
concerned about efficient service delivery and local self-determination, this finding 
might also indicate a general recognition that a lack of inter-municipal cooperation 
hinders the effective implementation of sustainable development policies.  
[Table 2 near here] 
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Pressures for metropolitan reform 
Our second main hypothesis assumed that pressures for creating a metropolitan 
government could be explained with individual’s perceptions of the general problem 
pressure, overall dysfunctionality of the governance structure, and their previous core 
beliefs leaning towards a particular school of metropolitan governance. The regression 
in table 3 shows that perceptions of problem pressure and dysfunctional governance 
indeed increase the probability of supporting a metropolitan reform – yet this effect 
holds only when the two factors appear together. In contrast, if mayors perceive strong 
problem pressures but attest at least one of the governance modes to work effectively, 
they will be unlikely to support a metropolitan reform. The same is true for mayors 
perceiving all governance modes as dysfunctional, but being less concerned about the 
overall problem pressure. Interestingly, mayors sharing central beliefs with the 
metropolitan reform school are not generally more likely to endorse a metropolitan 
reform. We only find evidence for a light conditioning effect of mayoral core beliefs, 
with reform-attuned mayors reacting less reluctantly when facing extensive 
metropolitan problem pressures.  
From figure 3, we can further appreciate how the three effects interact. In order 
to simplify interpretation, we treated the dependent variable as continuous and based the 
conditional effects on a replicated linear two-level regression (see online appendix, 
table 6). The figure shows how the aforementioned interaction effect is less pronounced 
with mayors leaning towards the reform school ideology (upper two panels). Mayors 
that are less fond of amalgamations and rather believe in the superiority of inter-
municipal cooperation, however, react in two opposing directions when confronted with 
metropolitan pressures (lower two panels). If at least one other governance mode is 
perceived as working effectively, they clearly abstain from a metropolitan reform. 
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However, if all governance modes in place are failing, they are clearly more willing to 
engage in the metropolitan experiment. 
Back at the regression table, once more the financial crisis and municipal 
finances seem to be irrelevant with regard to mayoral assessments regarding the need 
for metropolitan reform. Mayors perceiving their financial situation as (rather) poor are 
not more likely to support metropolitan reforms, all other things equal. Instead, our 
items on inter-governmental relations reveal a weak positive effect of mayors arguably 
taking a more positive stance towards cooperation, whereas defending the role of local 
governments in the political system rather seems to undermine the support for creating a 
metropolitan government. From the individual control variables, we find leftist and 
elder mayor to be more supportive of metropolitan government reforms. 
[Table 3 near here] 
[Figure 3 near here] 
Conclusions 
To start with, our descriptive analysis allows for a cross-national investigation of the 
satisfaction with existing governance structures, metropolitan problem solving 
capacities and the resulting pressures for metropolitan reform – everything from the 
perspective of city mayors and at a time of heightened fiscal pressures following the 
financial crisis of 2007. Departing from the three ideal-typical schools of metropolitan 
governance, we developed two main hypotheses on mayoral considerations when 
evaluating existing supra-local governance structures and when calling for metropolitan 
reforms.  
Based on our regression analyses, we can confirm that mayors associate 
particular governance modes to particular problem solving capacities – our hypothesis 1 
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– and that the association between multi-purpose governance arrangements and 
equitable distribution is the one shared most unanimously. With regard to the question 
of metropolitan reform, the most contentious issue seems to be cost-efficiency, since 
mayors associate cost-efficiency with the two governance modes pertaining to the 
opposing schools of metropolitan governance: reform school and public choice theory. 
Whether they attribute cost-efficiency to multi-purpose governance bodies or inter-
municipal cooperation seems to be mainly related to the individual perceptions and 
experiences with existing governance structures, rather than to principled conformity 
with the basic assumptions of either one or the other school. This shows that theoretical 
concepts of the metropolitan debate are in practice overlapping, with various effects 
being achieved by the means of various governance modes and mixtures.  
In view of our second hypothesis on pressures for metropolitan reform, we 
found no evidence for increased tensions emanating from the financial crisis and its 
differential impact on municipal finances. In fact, we found only a small group of 
mayors supporting the establishment of a metropolitan government. In line with our 
hypothesis, however, this group is best characterised as perceiving strong metropolitan 
problem pressures and being discontent with locally existing governance modes 
altogether. One or the other element alone yields the opposite result of shying away 
from any reform experiments at the metropolitan level. Again, more principled beliefs – 
at the heart of the dispute between various schools of metropolitan governance – seem 
to have only a subordinated role in the real world debate about metropolitan 
governance. 
While mayors today seem to have internalised some of the concurrent 
expectations of the various ideal typical metropolitan governance schools, their 
evaluations of locally existing governance modes and the support for metropolitan 
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reform seem to work on more pragmatic grounds, based on experience rather 
individually held principled beliefs, holding dear to proven structures also, and 
especially in times of turbulence. 
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Table 1: Overview of key variables for selected eight countries, 2015/16 
  Relevance of governance modes in place Problem solving capacities Support for reform 
  
Support and 
regulations by 
upper-level 
governments 
Multi-purpose 
governance bodies 
for the urban 
agglomeration 
Single-purpose 
authorities / special 
purpose districts 
Inter-municipal 
contracts and 
cooperation 
Implementing an 
area-wide 
sustainable 
development 
strategy (limiting 
sprawl, protecting 
natural resources) 
Cost-efficient 
production and 
delivery of public 
goods and services 
(e.g. energy, water, 
waste, maintenance, 
public safety) 
Equitable 
distribution of 
public goods and 
services across the 
larger urban 
agglomeration (e.g. 
education, culture, 
health, social 
welfare, adequate 
housing, 
transportation, area 
development) 
Creating 
metropolitan 
government(s) 
Greece Mean 3.41 3.03 3.06 3.81 4.13 3.90 3.97 3.13 
  (N) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (30) (32) (31) 
Spain Mean 3.38 3.15 2.66 3.88 4.05 4.13 4.15 3.11 
  (N) (137) (136) (134) (137) (142) (142) (141) (142) 
Switzerland Mean 3.13 3.11 3.31 3.82 3.84 3.67 3.00 2.77 
  (N) (45) (45) (45) (44) (45) (45) (45) (52) 
France Mean 2.88 3.68 2.88 3.15 3.55 3.88 3.12 2.68 
  (N) (33) (34) (33) (34) (33) (33) (33) (38) 
Germany Mean 2.83 3.30 3.62 3.73 3.50 3.57 3.37 2.85 
  (N) (192) (192) (191) (192) (195) (194) (193) (192) 
Poland Mean 2.84 3.21 3.23 3.72 3.27 3.66 3.87 - 
  (N) (49) (48) (47) (47) (62) (61) (62)  
Italy Mean 2.73 3.02 2.26 3.91 4.00 3.98 3.82 4.09 
  (N) (45) (44) (42) (45) (44) (43) (44) (46) 
Sweden Mean 2.48 3.23 2.96 3.52 3.19 3.81 3.04 1.73 
  (N) (27) (26) (27) (27) (27) (27) (27) (30) 
Remarks: Countries sorted by support from upper-level governments. Scale for governance modes and problem solving capacities from 1 (not effective at all) 
– 5 (highly effective). Scale for support for reform from 1 (highly undesirable) – 5 (highly desirable). (N) = number of observations.
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Table 2: Ordered logit two-level models for explaining mayoral perceptions of problem 
solving capacities 
 Equity Efficiency Sustainability 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
LEVEL 1: MAYOR / CITY      
Perception of relevant governance modes in place (dummies)      
- Upper-level government support and regulation (ULG) 0.38 0.49* 0.50* 0.54* 0.29  
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) 
- Multi-purpose governance bodies (MPG) 0.72** 0.92*** 0.86** 0.39 0.43  
(0.23) (0.25) (0.33) (0.23) (0.23) 
- Single-purpose authorities 0.14 0.17 0.19 -0.35 -0.33  
(0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) 
- Inter-municipal contracts and cooperation (IMC) 0.29 0.57** 0.55* 0.77*** 0.65** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) 
MPG x IMC   0.14   
   (0.52)   
ULG x IMC     0.71 
     (0.49) 
Leftist self-placement of mayor (dummy) 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.69*** 0.69*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Age (grand-mean centred) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male -0.21 0.09 0.09 -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Education (ref.: elementary school)      
- University degree -0.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.84 0.82 
 (0.43) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
- Secondary degree -0.18 -0.21 -0.21 0.41 0.39 
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Financial situation of city perceived as (rather) poor 0.26 0.15 0.15 -0.11 -0.09 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Population size of municipality (log., grand mean centred) -0.17 -0.15 -0.15 -0.38* -0.39* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Centre of metropolitan area 0.25 0.48 0.47 0.69 0.71 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
LEVEL 2: METROPOLITAN AREA      
Metropolitan governance structure (ref.: none)      
- Metropolitan governance body 0.28 -0.22 -0.22 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) 
- Metropolitan government -0.01 -0.42 -0.40 -0.24 -0.23 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Type of metropolitan area (ref.: smaller metropolitan area)      
- Secondary functional urban area -0.02 -0.13 -0.13 0.18 0.18 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
- Capital functional urban area 0.22 -0.11 -0.11 0.69 0.70 
 (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) 
Log Likelihood -571.37 -518.04 -518.00 -568.53 -567.48 
Num. obs. 454 428 428 456 456 
Groups (metropolitan area) 173 167 167 174 174 
Variance: metropolitan area (intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.11 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Fixed country effects (not reported). Models for efficiency without Sweden. 
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Table 3: Ordered logit two-level model for explaining mayoral support for creating 
metropolitan governments 
 Reform 
  
LEVEL 1: MAYOR / CITY  
All governance modes in place perceived as dysfunctional (dummy) -2.77** 
 (0.98) 
Perceived problem pressure (inverse of average problem solving capacity) -0.79*** 
 (0.19) 
Core beliefs: reform school (dummy) -0.80 
 (0.80) 
- All dysfunctional x problem pressure 1.29*** 
 (0.39) 
- All dysfunctional x reformist 2.21 
 (1.77) 
- Problem pressure x reformist 0.72* 
 (0.34) 
- All dysfunctional x problem pressure x reformist -1.06 
 (0.64) 
Importance of mayoral tasks  
- Inter-municipal cooperation 0.70* 
 (0.33) 
- Defending position of local governments in political system -0.72* 
 (0.31) 
Leftist self-placement of mayor (dummy) 0.58** 
 (0.21) 
Age (grand-mean centred) 0.02* 
 (0.01) 
Male -0.06 
 (0.26) 
Education (ref.: elementary school)  
- University degree -0.54 
 (0.47) 
- Secondary degree -0.32 
 (0.52) 
Financial situation of city perceived as (rather) poor 0.06 
 (0.22) 
Population size of municipality (log., grand mean centred) 0.25 
 (0.17) 
Centre of metropolitan area 0.10 
 (0.39) 
LEVEL 2: METROPOLITAN AREA  
Metropolitan governance structure (ref.: none)  
- Metropolitan governance body -0.03 
 (0.33) 
- Metropolitan government -0.07 
 (0.39) 
Type of metropolitan area (ref.: smaller metropolitan area)  
- Secondary functional urban area 0.76** 
 (0.27) 
- Capital functional urban area -0.30 
 (0.36) 
Log Likelihood -529.38 
Num. obs. 396 
Groups (metropolitan area) 144 
Variance: metropolitan area (intercept) 0.08 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Fixed country effects (not reported). 
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Table 4: Operationalization, question wording and measurement (POLLEADER II) 
Concept Question wording Original scale and transformations 
Filter question 
(for governance modes 
and problem solving 
capacities, see below) 
Is your municipality part of a larger urban agglomeration? A 
larger urban agglomeration encompasses an urban centre 
(over 50'000 inhabitants) and a belt of commuting zones (over 
15% of employed population commuting to the city for work). 
0/1 
Relevance of governance 
modes in place 
“Please consider the various existing measures that have an 
impact on the development of your larger urban 
agglomeration as a whole. How effective are presently the 
following modes of governance for the development of your 
agglomeration?” 
1 (not effective at all) to 
5 (highly effective) 
- Upper-level 
government support 
and regulations 
- Support and regulations by upper-level governments Dummy for each 
governance mode for its 
relative relevance: a 
value above 3 and above 
the individual median 
value of all governance 
modes (allowing for 1 
missing) 
- Multi-purpose 
governance bodies 
- Multi-purpose governance bodies for the urban 
agglomeration 
- Single-purpose 
authorities - Single-purpose authorities / special purpose districts 
- Inter-municipal 
contracts and 
cooperation 
- Inter-municipal contracts and cooperation 
All governance modes in 
place perceived as 
dysfunctional 
 Dummy for all 
governance modes with 
values of 3 and lower. 
Evaluation of problem 
solving capacities 
“Now taking all existing measures together, how effective do 
you consider them for tackling the following challenges 
involved in the development of your agglomeration?” 
1 (not effective at all) to 
5 (highly effective) 
- Equitable 
distribution 
- Implementing an area-wide sustainable development 
strategy (limiting sprawl, protecting natural resources) 
As independent 
variables: dummy for 
ineffective problem 
solving (1/2 vs. 3/4/5) 
- Cost-efficiency 
- Cost-efficient production and delivery of public goods 
and services (e.g. energy, water, waste, maintenance, 
public safety) 
- Sustainable 
development 
- Equitable distribution of public goods and services 
across the larger urban agglomeration (e.g. education, 
culture, health, social welfare, adequate housing, 
transportation, area development) 
Perceived problem 
pressure 
 Inverse average of all 
three problem solving 
capacities together 
Support for creating 
metropolitan government 
“How desirable or undesirable do you consider the following 
reforms, irrespective of whether they have been introduced in 
your context?” 
- Creating metropolitan government(s) 
1 (highly undesirable) to 
5 (highly desirable) 
Core beliefs: reform 
school (vs. public choice) 
“Intermunicipal cooperation and amalgamation of 
municipalities are alternative solutions for rationalizing local 
government.  
Which of them are more effective under the following 
profiles?” [Third option for each profile: There is no real 
utility in  cooperation or amalgamation] 
- Professionalization of administrative staff 
- Service quality 
- Cost saving 
- Political participation 
Dummy: amalgamation 
was ticked more often 
than inter-municipal 
cooperation 
 
Importance of mayoral 
tasks: 
“Many different tasks are associated with the mayor’s 
position.  
How important do you think the following tasks are?” 
1 (not a task of a mayor) 
to 5 (of utmost 
importance) 
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- inter-municipal 
cooperation 
- To foster the co-operation with the neighbouring 
municipalities 
Dummy: 4/5 vs. 1/2/3 - defending position of local 
governments in 
political system  
- To defend and promote the influence of local authorities 
in the political system 
Financial situation of city 
perceived as (rather poor) 
“How would describe the financial situation of your 
municipality?” 
1 (very poor) to 5 (very 
good) 
Dummy: 1/2 vs. 3/4/5 
Leftist self-placement of 
mayor 
“There is often talk about a left-right dimension in politics. 
Where would you place yourself on a left-right dimension?” 1 (left) to 10 (right) 
 
  
36 
 
Table 5: Ordered logit two-level model for explaining mayoral perceptions of problem 
solving capacities, conditional on mayoral reform school ideology 
 Equity Efficiency Sustainability 
 M1 M2 M4 
LEVEL 1: MAYOR / CITY    
Perception of relevant governance modes in place (dummies)    
- Upper-level government support and regulation (ULG) 0.43 0.35 0.60  
(0.25) (0.26) (0.31) 
- Multi-purpose governance bodies (MPG) 0.77** 0.85* 0.24 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.24) 
- Single-purpose authorities 0.27 0.40 -0.43  
(0.26) (0.30) (0.27) 
- Inter-municipal contracts and cooperation (IMC) 0.34 0.74** 1.02*** 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.24) 
Core beliefs: reform school (dummy) -0.06 -0.07 0.16 
 (0.23) (0.30) (0.29) 
- MPG x reformist -0.30 -0.36  
 (0.51) (0.62)  
- IMC x reformist  -0.68 -0.42 
  (0.45) (0.44) 
- ULG x reformist   -0.22 
   (0.55) 
Leftist self-placement of mayor (dummy) 0.23 0.05 0.75*** 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) 
Age (grand-mean centred) 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male -0.27 0.06 -0.14 
 (0.26) (0.28) (0.27) 
Education (ref.: elementary school)    
- University degree -0.24 -0.40 0.83 
 (0.44) (0.48) (0.47) 
- Secondary degree -0.15 -0.47 0.38 
 (0.49) (0.53) (0.51) 
Financial situation of city perceived as (rather poor) 0.27 0.04 -0.15 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) 
Population size of municipality (log., grand mean centred) -0.14 -0.08 -0.46** 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) 
Centre of metropolitan area 0.27 0.42 0.74 
 (0.39) (0.45) (0.40) 
LEVEL 2: METROPOLITAN AREA    
Metropolitan governance structure (ref.: none)    
- Metropolitan governance body 0.32 -0.14 -0.25 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.30) 
- Metropolitan government 0.14 -0.11 -0.25 
 (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) 
Type of metropolitan area (ref.: smaller metropolitan area)    
- Secondary functional urban area 0.03 -0.29 0.17 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) 
- Capital functional urban area 0.25 -0.26 0.70 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.38) 
Log Likelihood -513.25 -425.31 -502.71 
Num. obs. 408 353 409 
Groups (metropolitan area) 151 125 151 
Variance: metropolitan area (intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.13 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Fixed country effects (not reported). Models for efficiency without Sweden and France. 
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Table 6: Linear two-level model for explaining mayoral support for creating 
metropolitan governments 
 Reform 
LEVEL 1: MAYOR / CITY  
All governance modes in place perceived as dysfunctional (dummy) -1.35* 
 (0.54) 
Perceived problem pressure (inverse of average problem solving capacity) -0.41*** 
 (0.10) 
Core beliefs: reform school (dummy) -0.28 
 (0.43) 
- All dysfunctional x problem pressure 0.62** 
 (0.21) 
- All dysfunctional x reformist 1.07 
 (0.99) 
- Problem pressure x reformist 0.32 
 (0.18) 
- All dysfunctional x problem pressure x reformist -0.50 
 (0.35) 
Importance of mayoral tasks  
- Inter-municipal cooperation 0.38* 
 (0.17) 
- Defending position of local governments in political system -0.32* 
 (0.16) 
Leftist self-placement of mayor (dummy) 0.32** 
 (0.11) 
Age (grand-mean centred) 0.01* 
 (0.01) 
Male -0.01 
 (0.14) 
Education (ref.: elementary school)  
- University degree -0.28 
 (0.24) 
- Secondary degree -0.17 
 (0.27) 
Financial situation of city perceived as (rather poor) 0.05 
 (0.12) 
Population size of municipality (log., grand mean centred) 0.16 
 (0.09) 
Centre of metropolitan area 0.01 
 (0.21) 
LEVEL 2: METROPOLITAN AREA  
Metropolitan governance structure (ref.: none)  
- Metropolitan governance body -0.02 
 (0.16) 
- Metropolitan government -0.02 
 (0.21) 
Type of metropolitan area (ref.: smaller metropolitan area)  
- Secondary functional urban area 0.34* 
 (0.15) 
- Capital functional urban area -0.14 
 (0.21) 
Log Likelihood -581.90 
Num. obs. 396 
Groups (metropolitan area) 144 
Variance: metropolitan area (intercept) 0.06 
Variance: residual 0.97 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Fixed country effects (not reported). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework for the study of perceived problem solving capacities 
and reform pressures 
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Figure 2: Shares of mayors perceiving multi-purpose governance bodies as relevant for 
addressing challenges in their particular urban agglomeration 
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Figure 3: Conditional effects of problem pressures on support for metropolitan reform 
 
 
 
